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DE-TORTURING THE LOGIC:
THE CONTRIBUTION OF CAT GENERAL
COMMENT 2 TO THE DEBATE OVER
EXTRAORDINARY RENDITION
Margaret L. Satterthwaite*
I. THE EXTRAORDINARY RENDITION AND
SECRET DETENTION PROGRAM
Shortly after the attacks of 9/11, President George W. Bush
gave the CIA authorization to set up a secret program aimed at
taking terrorism suspects “off the streets.”1  The resulting ex-
traordinary rendition and secret detention program (“the Pro-
gram”) reportedly involves the covert approval of “kill, capture or
detain” (“K-C-D”) orders for specific individuals.2  As the name im-
plies, such K-C-D orders purport to allow U.S. agents—secretly and
without warning to those targeted—to apprehend, imprison, and
even target for death those individuals who are determined to be
eligible for the Program.  What this has meant in practice is that
certain individuals are apprehended and transferred to the custody
of foreign governments for interrogation, others are apprehended
and sent to secret prisons—so-called CIA “black sites,” and others
may have been summarily killed.
The U.S. government has not released comprehensive infor-
* Associate Professor of Clinical Law and Faculty Director, Center for Human
Rights and Global Justice, New York University School of Law.  Sections of these re-
marks draw significantly on a series of articles I have published on the topic of rendi-
tion, including Rendered Meaningless: Extraordinary Rendition and the Rule of Law, 75
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1333 (2007) [hereinafter Rendered Meaningless]; Human Rights and
Humanitarian Law in the “War on Terror”: The Story of El Masri v. Tenet, in HUMAN
RIGHTS ADVOCACY STORIES (Deena Hurwitz & Margaret L. Satterthwaite with Douglas
Ford eds., forthcoming 2008); Extraordinary Rendition and Disappearances in the “War on
Terror,” 10 GONZ. J. INT’L L. 70 (2006); and Tortured Logic: Renditions to Justice, Ex-
traordinary Rendition, and Human Rights Law, 6 THE LONG TERM VIEW 52 (2006), co-
authored with Angelina Fisher.  Work on this chapter was supported by the Filomen
D’Agostino Research Fund at New York University School of Law.  I am grateful to
Tafadzwa Pasipanodya (NYU J.D. ’08) for her impeccable research assistance.
1 Press Release, Office of the Press Sec’y, President Discusses Creation of Military
Tribunals to Try Suspected Terrorists (Sept. 6, 2006), available at http://georgew
bush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2006/09/20060906-3.html.
2 See Eur. Consult. Ass., Secret Detentions and Illegal Transfers of Detainees involving
Council of Europe Member States: Second Report, Doc. No. 11302 rev.  (June 11, 2007)
[hereinafter Council of Europe June 2007 Report], available at http://assembly.coe.int/
Documents/WorkingDocs/Doc07/edoc11302.pdf.
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mation about the Program; still unknown are the exact number
and identities of people subject to K-C-D orders, the number and
identities of people rendered to third countries for interrogation,
the number and identities of individuals held in secret CIA “black
sites,” and the number killed through operation of a K-C-D order.
Concerning transfers to foreign governments, the estimates range
from about 100 to several thousand.  The best guess for “black
sites” is that about three dozen individuals have been held in such
facilities.3  The number of people who have been summarily killed
is unknown.
Despite this secrecy, we know a significant amount about the
Program through selective government disclosures4 and the stories
of those who have emerged from it.  We know about extraordinary
rendition through Maher Arar, a Canadian citizen wrongly identi-
fied as an al Qaeda member, who was transferred from New York to
Syria where he was detained and tortured for about a year before
being released.  We know about the secret detention program
through Khaled El-Masri, a German citizen who was wrongly ac-
cused of being an al Qaeda member, abducted in Macedonia and
sent to a secret CIA prison in Afghanistan, where he was held for
five months and subjected to coercive interrogation.5
In contrast with the government’s attempts to keep secret cer-
tain facts about the Program, the United States has not been quiet
about its legal justifications.  Indeed, the U.S. government has ac-
tively made a series of legal arguments aimed at justifying the Pro-
gram.  Although those who defend the Program do not explicitly
support the use of informal transfer due to a risk of torture, pro-
longed incommunicado detention, or targeted killings, defenders
of the Program imply that it is legal by pointing to what they claim
are lacunae in the relevant legal frameworks.6  The administration
suggests that where lacunae are found, prohibitions give way to
permission; territories outside the United States are conceptual-
3 Dana Priest, CIA Holds Terror Suspects in Secret Prisons, WASH. POST, Nov. 2, 2005,
at A01.
4 For a thorough account of government disclosures concerning secret detention
and extraordinary rendition, see CENTER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND GLOBAL JUSTICE, ON
THE RECORD: U.S. DISCLOSURES ON RENDITION, SECRET DETENTION, AND COERCIVE IN-
TERROGATION (2008) [hereinafter CHRGJ], available at http://www.chrgj.org/
projects/docs/ontherecord.pdf.
5 Linda Greenhouse, Justices Turn Aside Case of Man Accusing C.I.A. of Torture, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 10, 2007, at A20.
6 Jason Leopold, The Bush Team’s Geneva Hypocrisy, THE PUB. RECORD, Apr. 24,
2008, ], available at http://www.consortiumnews.com/2008/042508a.html (last visited
Feb. 12, 2009).
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ized as locations where the United States may act as it pleases,7
informal promises between countries replace the absolute prohibi-
tion of certain transfers,8 and the war paradigm is used to deprive
individuals of the protection of the law.9
I will not attempt to explore all of these arguments in my brief
remarks today.  Instead, I will focus my comments on the very sig-
nificant contributions that the U.N. Committee Against Torture’s
General Comment 2 makes to closing the loopholes that the
United States has tried to claim and exploit.  I will focus on the two
most well-known elements of the Program: extraordinary rendition
and secret detention.  Targeted killings will be left for another day.
II. CAT STANDARDS RELEVANT TO THE EXTRAORDINARY
RENDITION AND SECRET DETENTION PROGRAM
Although there have been vigorous debates in the United
States about the legality of the extraordinary rendition and secret
detention Program, intergovernmental organizations such as the
Council of Europe,10 the European Parliament,11 the Human
Rights Committee,12 and the Committee Against Torture
(“CAT”)13 have stated unequivocally that the Program contravenes
international human rights law binding on the United States.
7 Neil A. Lewis & Eric Schmitt, The Reach Of War: Legal Opinions; Lawyers Decided
Bans On Torture Didn’t Bind Bush, N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 2004, at A1.
8 Human Rights Watch, THE “STAMP OF GUANTANAMO” THE STORY OF SEVEN MEN
BETRAYED BY RUSSIA’S DIPLOMATIC ASSURANCES TO THE UNITED STATES (Vol. 19 No.
2(D)) (2007), available at http:www.hrw.org/en/reports/2007/03/28/stamp-guanta-
namo-0.
9 Liliana Segura, The Bush Era’s Dark Legacy of Torture, ALTERNET, Oct. 27, 2007,
http://www.alternet.org/rights/66270 (last visited Sept. 9, 2008).
10 Council of Europe June 2007 Report, supra note 2; Temp. Comm. on the Alleged
Use of European Countries by the CIA for the Transp. and Illegal Det. of Prisoners
[TDIP], Interim Report on the Alleged Use of European Countries by the CIA for the Transpor-
tation and Illegal Detention of Prisoners, EUR. PARL. Doc. A6-0213/2006 (June 15, 2006),
available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/seance_pleniere/textes_de-
poses/rapports/2006/0213/P6_A(2006)0213_EN.pdf.
11 TDIP, Report on the Alleged Use of European Countries by the CIA for the Transportation
and Illegal Detention of Prisoners, EUR. PARL. Doc. A6-0020/2007 (Jan. 30, 2007), avail-
able at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegWeb/application/registre/simpleSearch.
faces (search “Report on the Alleged Use of European Countries by the CIA for the
Transportation and Illegal Detention of Prisoners”).
12 U.N. Human Rights Comm., Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Commit-
tee: United States of America, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/USA/CO/3/Rev.1 (Dec. 18, 2006).
13 U.N. Comm. Against Torture, Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties
Under Article 19 of the Convention Second Periodic Reports of States Parties Due in 1999,
Addendum, United States of America, ¶ 5, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/48/Add.3 (June 29, 2005)
[hereinafter U.S. Second Periodic Report to Committee Against Torture] (considering U.S.
report submitted May 6, 2005).
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The relevant human rights norms protecting against ex-
traordinary rendition and secret detention include the following:
the prohibition of refoulement, which proscribes transfers of people
to places where they will likely be subjected to torture; the prohibi-
tion of enforced disappearances, which proscribes the conceal-
ment of the fate and whereabouts of individuals deprived of their
liberty; and the norm against torture and cruel, inhuman or de-
grading treatment.14  I will briefly summarize these norms in the
context of the extraordinary rendition and secret detention
program.
The prohibition of refoulement is set out in a wide variety of
human rights instruments.  Most relevant today is the Convention
Against Torture and Other Forms of Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment (“Torture Convention” or “the Convention”). CAT Arti-
cle 3 prohibits the transfer of individuals to States where they may be in
danger of torture: “No State Party shall expel, return (“refouler”) or
extradite a person to another State where there are substantial
grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being sub-
jected to torture.”15
This article has been interpreted to apply to all forms of inter-
State transfer of individuals, and therefore applies to informal
transfers such as rendition, in which a person is abducted and for-
cibly transferred without any recourse to review procedures.  When
extraordinary rendition involves transfer to a country where an in-
dividual is at real risk of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment, the transfer is prohibited by binding international
human rights law.16
14 Also relevant but not addressed here are, among others, rights against arbitrary
detention, rights to consular access, and due process rights.
15 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treat-
ment or Punishment, art. 2, ¶ 1, Dec. 10, 1984, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100-20 (1988), 1465
U.N.T.S. 85, 23 I.L.M. 1027 (1984) [hereinafter Convention].
16 As the CAT Committee has explained: “The Committee is concerned that the
State party considers that the non-refoulement obligation, under Article 3 of the Con-
vention, does not extend to a person detained outside its territory.  The Committee is
also concerned by the State party’s rendition of suspects, without any judicial proce-
dure, to States where they face a real risk of torture (art. 3).  The State party should
apply the non-refoulement guarantee to all detainees in its custody, cease the rendition
of suspects, in particular by its intelligence agencies, to States where they face a real
risk of torture, in order to comply with its obligations under article 3 of the Conven-
tion.  The State party should always ensure that suspects have the possibility to chal-
lenge decisions of refoulement.” Comm. Against Torture, Conclusions and
Recommendations of the Committee Against Torture, United States of America, ¶ 20, U.N.
Doc. CAT/C/USA/C/2, (May 19, 2006) [hereinafter Recommendations of the CAT]
(emphasis added).
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Transfers to secret detention are likewise prohibited, in part
because prolonged incommunicado detention like that which de-
tainees experience in CIA “black sites” has itself been found to con-
stitute—at minimum—cruel and inhuman treatment.17  When
combined with coercive interrogation techniques, this kind of se-
cret detention regime is more properly identified as one that en-
tails torture.  In addition, there is no doubt that secret detention
is—in itself—unlawful under international human rights law.  The
U.N. Committee Against Torture has found that secret detention is
a per se violation of the Torture Convention.18  Further, when car-
ried out in the manner used in the Program, secret detention
amounts to enforced disappearance,19 which is unlawful under cus-
tomary international law.20
III. THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF GENERAL COMMENT 2
TO CLOSING U.S. “LOOPHOLES”
The U.S. government has focused a great deal of energy in the
last several years on efforts to carve out legal space for its actions in
the “war on terror.”  Instead of simply acting as a scofflaw, the
United States has systematically produced legal arguments, pursu-
ant to both international and domestic law, to support its actions.21
In relation to the extraordinary rendition and secret detention
Program, the strategy has been to try to clear a space for actions
17 Velasquez-Rodriguez v. Honduras, Case 7920, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 4/
88, OEA/Ser.L./V/III.19, doc. 13 ¶ 156 (1988).
18 Recommendations of the CAT, supra note 16.
19 The recently-concluded International Convention for the Protection of All Per-
sons from Enforced Disappearance (adopted by the General Assembly in December
2006) defines enforced disappearance as:
[T]he arrest, detention, abduction or any other form of deprivation of
liberty by agents of the State or by persons or groups of persons acting
with the authorization, support or acquiescence of the State, followed
by a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty or by concealment
of the fate or whereabouts of the disappeared person, which place such
a person outside the protection of the law.
International Convention for the Protection of All persons from Enforced Disappear-
ance, G.A. Res. 61/177, art. 2, U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/177 (Dec. 20, 2006).
20 While the United States has not ratified the International Convention for the
Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance, it is bound by the customary
international law norm prohibiting enforced disappearance. See, e.g., Lucien J.
Dhooge, Lohengrin Revealed: The Implications of Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain for Human Rights
Litigation Pursuant to the Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 393,
465 (2006).
21 See Margaret L. Satterthwaite, Rendered Meaningless: Extraordinary Rendition and
the Rule of Law, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1333 (2007) (discussing at length the legal
arguments made by Bush Administration in support of the extraordinary rendition
program).
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free of international legal constraints.  General Comment 2 speaks
directly to several of the main arguments the United States has
made, revealing them to be contrary to international human rights
law.
A. Clarification of the Scope of Application of the Torture Convention
The first argument the United States advances in support of its
rendition program is that human rights law only applies within the
territory of a ratifying State—in other words, that human rights
norms do not apply extraterritorially.  In its reports to the United
Nations treaty bodies monitoring the implementation of human
rights treaties, the United States has consistently maintained that,
unless explicitly specified otherwise, the United States is bound by
human rights treaties only in activities it conducts within U.S. terri-
tory.22  In other words, if you are outside the United States but
under the control of the U.S. government, you are unprotected by
human rights norms.  Thus, the United States asserts, it is not
bound by Article 3 of the Convention when acting outside its
territory.
General Comment 2 clarifies the scope of application of the
Torture Convention, affirming that the phrase “any territory under
its jurisdiction,” used in a number of key provisions in the Conven-
tion, refers to any territory, facility, or person under the de jure or
de facto control of a State party.23  This is a crucial clarification in
the law.
The U.S. argument that the non-refoulement rule does not apply
outside of its territory was unconvincing even before the promulga-
tion of General Comment 2—in part because Article 3 does not
specify a territorial scope at all.  Instead, it states a clear obligation
of States: not to transfer a person to another State where he is at
risk of torture.24  Many have argued that this plainly applies to any
individual under the de facto control of a State party, to no avail.25
Now that the Committee has made clear that even those arti-
22 Human Rights Comm., Initial Reports of States Parties Due in 1993: United States of
America, ¶¶ 12-25, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/81/Add.4 (Aug. 24, 1994); see also Comm.
Against Torture, United States of America, Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Par-
ties Under Article 19 of the Convention, ¶¶ 183-88, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/28/Add.5 (Feb. 9,
2000).
23 Recommendations of the CAT, supra note 18.
24 Convention, supra note 15.
25 See, e.g., Barbara Cochrane Alexander, Convention Against Torture: A Viable Alter-
native Legal Remedy for Domestic Violence Victims, 15 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 895 (2000);
Satterthwaite, supra note 21.
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cles that do specify a territorial scope of application apply to any
location or person under the effective control of a State party, the
U.S. position vis-a`-vis Article 3 is even weaker.  It would be absurd
to say that even though a U.S. detention facility on foreign territory
is covered by the obligation to prevent cruel, inhuman or degrad-
ing treatment set out in Article 16, the prohibition of non-refoule-
ment set out in Article 3 does not apply to someone that U.S. agents
abduct in Jordan because that person is not in U.S. territory.  In-
deed, such an argument appears incoherent.
This clarification about territoriality is extremely relevant to
the destination for many individuals subject to the extraordinary
rendition program: so-called CIA “black sites,” where “enhanced
interrogation techniques” or “alternative procedures” such as sleep
deprivation, sensory manipulation, and even waterboarding have
been authorized and used.26  For many years, however, the United
States has interpreted Article 16—requiring States to prohibit
cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment—to apply only to the
U.S. territory.  This interpretation, while not overtly argued, was
plainly relied upon by the CIA in designing the “enhanced interro-
gation techniques,” which would only be used in “black sites” far
from U.S. territory.  Indeed, when the U.S. Supreme Court made
clear that Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions applied to
those apprehended and detained in connection with the “war on
terror,” the CIA moved to shut down the secret detention program,
and CIA agents began to buy personal liability insurance.27  It was
thus clear that the CIA feared that the interrogation techniques
used in secret detention were violations of Common Article 3’s
prohibition on inhumane treatment.  Had the United States ac-
cepted that the Convention’s Article 16 applied to these facilities
from the outset of the “war on terror,” the “alternative proce-
dures”—which plainly amount at least to cruel, inhuman or de-
grading treatment prohibited by the Torture Convention—
perhaps would never have been approved.
B. The Non-Derogable Nature of the Prohibition of Torture
Another crucial contribution of General Comment 2 is that it
emphasizes the non-derogability of the prohibition on torture.
The General Comment underlines that no circumstances whatso-
ever—including “threat of terrorist acts” or either international or
26 See, e.g., Priest, supra note 3; CHRGJ, ON THE RECORD, supra note 4.
27 R. Jeffrey Smith, Worried CIA Officers Buy Legal Insurance; Plans Fund Defense In
Anti-Terror Cases, WASH. POST, Sept. 11, 2006, at A01; see also CHRGJ, supra note 4.
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non-international armed conflict—may be invoked to avoid or di-
lute the obligations set out in the Convention.28
This clarification is badly needed in light of U.S. legal argu-
ments that treat international humanitarian law as the only rele-
vant law applicable to the “war on terror.” Extraordinary rendition
and secret detention often take place far from any traditional bat-
tlefield.  Whether these operations qualify as part of an armed con-
flict governed by humanitarian law—either its authorizing norms
or its limiting rules—is hotly contested.29  Of course, humanitarian
law authorizes—or at least accepts— the use of lethal force by privi-
leged combatants (armies and militias that follow the rules of war),
and limits the use of force and coercion in relation to protected
persons (including prisoners of war, civilians, and those placed hors
de combat because of injury or sickness).30  In relation to extraordi-
nary rendition, the question is what law applies to the transfer and
the secret detention of individuals the United States asserts are un-
lawful combatants in a new kind of war.
In this new kind of war, the United States claims that it is en-
gaged in an armed conflict against al Qaeda—or more broadly,
against terrorism31—in which the entire world is literally a battle-
28 Recommendations of the CAT, supra note 16.
29 In launching its attacks on Afghanistan, the Administration declared that it was
engaged in an international armed conflict.  At first, this approach was largely ac-
cepted by the international community: the magnitude of the attacks on the World
Trade Center and the Pentagon were deemed sufficient to trigger the inherent right
of self-defense, and few countries argued that it was unlawful or inappropriate to tar-
get the Taliban as well as al Qaeda in response.  The controversy began when the
United States declared that detainees picked up on the battlefield in Afghanistan
were not entitled to protection under the Geneva Conventions—neither the Third
Geneva Convention (which protects prisoners of war) nor the Fourth Convention
(which protects civilians). See, e.g., Memorandum from Alberto R. Gonzales on Deci-
sion re Application of the Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War to the Conflict
with al Qaeda and the Taliban to the President (Jan. 25, 2002), reprinted in KAREN J.
GREENBERG & JOSHUA L. DRATEL, THE TORTURE PAPERS 118, 119 (2005) (“In my judg-
ment, this new paradigm renders obsolete Geneva’s strict limitations on questioning
of enemy prisoners and renders quaint some of its provisions . . . .”).
30 See, e.g., Gabor Rona, International Law Under Fire: Interesting Times for Interna-
tional Humanitarian Law: Challenges from the “War on Terror,” 27 FLETCHER F. WORLD
AFF. 55 (2003).
31 As Marco Sasso`li explains:
Astonishingly . . . the administration proceeded to declare that it was
engaged in a single worldwide international armed conflict against a
non-State actor (Al-Qaeda) or perhaps also against a social or criminal
phenomenon (terrorism) if not a moral category (evil).  This worldwide
conflict started—without the United States characterizing it as such at
that time—at some point in the 1990s and will continue until victory.
Marco Sasso`li, Use and Abuse of the Laws of War in the “War on Terrorism,” 22 LAW & INEQ.
195, 197–98 (2004).
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field where unlawful combatants are subject to being killed, cap-
tured or detained without notice (hence the potential to issue K-C-
D orders).32  This argument is aimed at legitimating the Adminis-
tration’s use of military or military-like techniques against a non-
State enemy, while insulating its actions against that enemy from
assessment under international humanitarian or human rights law.
In its interactions with United Nations human rights bodies,
the United States has asserted that it is engaged in a “war on ter-
ror” that is governed exclusively by the laws of armed conflict.33  In
making this assertion, the United States has argued that interna-
tional humanitarian law is the applicable lex specialis,34 i.e. that it
provides the relevant specialized, substantive rules regarding the
treatment of individuals in the “war on terror.”  In combination,
the Administration’s reference to the lex specialis rule and its argu-
ment that it can “render” suspected terrorists as part of its “war on
terror,” seem to indicate that no law applies to protect individuals
against such transfers.  The legal vacuum is constructed as follows:
since the transfers occur as part of an armed conflict, we must look
to humanitarian law for any relevant rules concerning transfers.  Al
Qaeda members, however, are unprivileged combatants, and thus
unprotected by rules found in the Geneva Conventions concerning
the transfer of prisoners of war or other protected persons.35  Fi-
nally, the argument concludes, the rules of human rights law do
32 The President determined that the Geneva Conventions applied to the “present
conflict with the Taliban,” but found that “the Taliban detainees are unlawful combat-
ants and, therefore, do not qualify as prisoners of war under article 4 of [the Third]
Geneva [Convention].” Memorandum from President George W. Bush on Humane
Treatment of al Qaeda and Taliban Detainees to the Vice President (Feb. 7, 2002),
reprinted in KAREN J. GREENBERG & JOSHUA L. DRATEL, THE TORTURE PAPERS 134 (2005)
(“none of the provisions of Geneva apply to our conflict with al Qaeda in Afghanistan
or elsewhere throughout the world . . . .”). This decision was based on a series of
memos prepared by Bush Administration officials, the State Department, and the mil-
itary concerning the proper interpretation of several technical provisions of the Third
Geneva Convention. See generally Memorandum from Assistant Attorney General Jay
S. Bybee to the White House Counsel on the Status of Taliban Forces Under Article 4
of the Third Geneva Convention of 1949 to Counsel to the President Alberto R. Gon-
zales, reprinted in KAREN J. GREENBERG & JOSHUA L. DRATEL, THE TORTURE PAPERS
138–43 (2005).
33 See REPLY OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TO THE RE-
PORT OF THE FIVE UNHCR SPECIAL RAPPORTEURS ON DETAINEES IN GUANTANAMO BAY,
CUBA, 16 (2006), available at http://www.asil.org/pdfs/ilib0603212.pdf (“The United
States is engaged in a continuing armed conflict against Al Qaida, and customary law
of war applies to the conduct of that war and related detention operations.”).
34 Id. at 22.
35 Memorandum from the White House on Humane Treatment of al Qaeda and
Taliban Detainees (Feb. 7, 2002), available at http://www.pegc.us/archive/White_
House/bush.memo.20020207.pdf.
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not apply either, since humanitarian law operates as lex specialis to
oust such rules from application.36  For this reason, suspected ter-
rorists may be informally transferred from place to place without
those transfers being unlawful, since no law applies.37
A similar—though more textual—argument has been made in
relation to secret detention.  In the few instances in which the
United States has defended the practice, it has alleged that certain
individuals who pose a threat to security are not protected by the
Geneva Conventions’ provisions concerning access by the Interna-
tional Committee of the Red Cross (“ICRC”) to detainees.38  Simul-
taneously, the United States implies that the Geneva Conventions
are the only relevant source of any obligations to allow access to
detainees or to disclose the location of such detainees held in the
context of armed conflict.  In other words, the United States indi-
cates that because they are not covered by the Convention provi-
sions concerning access to detainees, such individuals are not
protected against secret detention.39  The ICRC has repeatedly
sought access to detainees held in secret locations, and has ex-
pressed concern publicly about the practice.40
In the context of extraordinary rendition and secret deten-
tion, this has allowed the United States to argue that human rights
law does not apply to actions aimed at “capturing and detaining”
suspected terrorists, and that those actions are not therefore sub-
ject to the non-refoulement rule since the United States can locate no
36 Marko Milanovic, The Interplay Between Human Rights and Humanitarian
Law, Opinio Juris (May 10, 2007), http://www.opiniojuris.org/2007/05/10/the-inter-
play-between-human-rights-and-humanitarian-law/ (last visited Sept. 2, 2008).
37 For a thorough critique of this approach, see Satterthwaite, Rendered Meaningless,
supra note 21.
38 See, e.g., Steven R. Weisman, U.S. Rebuffs Red Cross Request for Access to Detainees
Held in Secret, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10, 2005, at A10.
39 See, e.g., Sean McCormack, Department of State Daily Press Briefing, (May 12,
2006) (“Look, there are—under the Geneva Conventions there is a certain category
of individual, and this is allowed for under the Geneva Conventions, individuals who
forfeit their rights under Geneva Convention protections, and they do this through a
variety of different actions. So there are a group of—there are allowances in the Ge-
neva Convention for individuals who would not be covered by that convention and,
therefore the party holding them would not be subject to the Geneva Conventions in
providing access to those individuals.”).
40 See INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, US DETENTION RELATED TO THE EVENTS OF
11 SEPTEMBER 2001 AND ITS AFTERMATH—THE ROLE OF THE ICRC, May 14, 2004, http:/
/www.cicr.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/5yyh5x?opendocument (noting that
the ICRC has “repeatedly appealed to the American authorities for access to people
detained in undisclosed locations. . . .  Beyond Bagram and Guanta´namo Bay, the
ICRC is increasingly concerned about the fate of an unknown number of people cap-
tured as part of the so-called global war on terror and held in undisclosed locations.”)
(last visited Sept. 2, 2008).
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explicit non-refoulement rule in the International Humanitarian Law
that governs non-international armed conflicts.  General Comment
2 closes this argument down by making clear that the prohibition
on both torture and cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment oper-
ates at all times, and that the non-refoulement rule, as a measure
aimed at preventing torture and ill-treatment, must also continue
to apply.41
C. Those Accused of Terrorist Crimes are at Risk of Torture
General Comment 2 calls attention to the fact that individuals
accused of terrorist acts are especially at risk of torture.42  This clar-
ification calls attention to the special vulnerability of detainees ac-
cused of terrorist crimes to torture and cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment.  This vulnerability stems from the abhor-
rence with which society rightly regards acts of violence that delib-
erately target civilians.  And it is just this rightful abhorrence that
should also lead States to interpose safeguards to ensure that even
those who society despises are not tortured or subjected to ill-treat-
ment.  This is crucial to upholding society’s values, and like inter-
national humanitarian law, which is designed precisely to protect
detainees against the often-legitimate anger of their enemy jailers,
measures to prevent ill-treatment of terrorism suspects should be
systematically implemented.
The United States has intentionally avoided clarifying that
even legitimate anger cannot be expressed as torture and ill-treat-
ment.  Instead, the U.S. government has exploited the anger that
the American public has experienced to argue that terrorism sus-
pects are not legally protected against ill treatment.  These argu-
ments—often in the background of public discourse—have led to
the tacit acceptance of policies and practices like those revealed in
the Abu Ghraib scandal.  The General Comment reminds us that
the prohibition on torture and ill-treatment is absolute, and that
States must be especially vigilant when dealing with those individu-
als who their agents may despise.
41 See Recommendations of the CAT, supra note 18; see also Convention, supra note
15.
42 See U.N. Office of the High Comm’n on Human Rights [OHCHR], Comm.
Against Torture, Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, General Comment No. 2: Implementation of Article 2 by States Par-
ties, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/GC/2 (Jan. 24, 2008) [hereinafter General Comment No. 2].
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D. The Interdependence of Measures to Prevent Torture and Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
General Comment 2 underscores the interdependence be-
tween the prevention of cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment
and the prevention of torture.  This clarification is relevant to both
extraordinary rendition and to secret detention.  In relation to ex-
traordinary rendition, emphasizing that obligations to prevent tor-
ture and obligations to prevent cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment are “interdependent, indivisible, and interrelated” is cru-
cial.  The U.S. government has exploited the distinction between
the two types of ill-treatment in the non-refoulement context, by argu-
ing that Article 3 of the Convention applies only to torture, and
not to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment.43  This has meant
that the United States takes a very cramped view of prohibited con-
duct—it believes that nothing prohibits it from transferring an in-
dividual to a risk of ill-treatment.  The General Comment suggests
that the obligation to prevent torture means that States may not
transfer individuals to a risk of cruel, inhuman or degrading treat-
ment or punishment.
IV. CONCLUSION
The U.S. government continues to argue that its secret pro-
gram is not prohibited by human rights law.  Recently, another in-
dividual was transferred to Guanta´namo out of CIA custody,
demonstrating that the “black sites” are still in operation.  While
even the most brilliantly written General Comment may not con-
vince American leaders to reverse course, clear statements of the
law do act as a check on the proliferation of such arguments.  By
clarifying that the Convention extends to the extraterritorial ac-
tions of ratifying States, that the duty to prevent torture and cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment continues to be in effect even
during armed conflict, and that States must actively ensure that
those most vulnerable to abuse—including those suspected of terri-
ble crimes—are protected against torture and ill-treatment, Gen-
eral Comment 2 makes a very significant contribution.
43 Dawn J. Miller, Holding States to Their Convention Obligations: The United Nations
Convention Against Torture and the Need for a Broad Interpretation of State Action, 17 GEO.
IMMIGR. L.J. 299, 303 (2003).
